Refugee Migration as Wicked Problem: From Palliative Response to Governing Policy[1]

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With images of refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea in less then seaworthy boats, of refugees from Syria halted in camps at the borders of various Balkan states, with Kenya closing the world's largest refugee camp, reports about molestation of children in Nauru, deportations of Afghan refugees from the European Union and from Pakistan, and reports of tightening regulations of Western countries regarding the influx of refugees, migration is – once again – a major challenge for governments. In the increasingly anti-immigration mood in receiving countries, refugee migration is more regarded in terms of economics and security and less seen as a humanitarian challenge that calls for collaboration across borders (Safdar 2016). Reflective of the anti-immigration atmosphere in Europe is the fact that the top 18 most worsened scores on the Refugees Indicator of the Fund for Peace are European, but keep in mind that most of these do not rank in the top 30 for pressures from refugees (Messner 2016, 14). What makes contemporary migrations different from previous migrations is that it is no longer a problem of sovereign governments only, but one that actually calls for international collaboration between these sovereign governments and various nonprofit organizations . While human beings are generally believed to be the most cooperative species ever, it is extremely difficult to develop a global response to the challenges that migration poses for societies and their governments. International migration is, in fact, a wicked problem, since it involves many different stakeholders, concerns issues of which the causes are multiple and layered, and it can only be resolved partially and temporarily since changing time and context will demand continuous adaptation of policy (Rittel and Webber 1973).

Migration in general, however, is not something of recent or somewhat recent concern. It has been a feature in human societies for at least 50,000 years (section one). While the numbers

about migration streams around the world are well known, the sheer size of migration merits some attention (section two). Equally well-known are reasons why people migrate, and the listings of so-called push- and pull-factors are quite consistent (section three). There is also significant consistency in legal and policy responses by migrant supplying and migrant receiving countries, and the policies that are now dominant can be – somewhat provocatively – summarized as palliative policies (section four). As the term *palliative policy* indicates, current government policies deal with the rather superficial symptoms and consequences of migration (e.g., food, clothing, shelter, employment) rather than with the deeper, underlying social and economic trends and policy overall (section five). To be sure, we need both immediate responses to the most egregious circumstances that migrants face as well as a substantial change in government policy. That kind of substantial change will take courage.

One word of warning with regard to the contents of this paper is that I am no scholar of international migration and so this is more a discussion paper and certainly not a research paper. The literature on migration in extensive and that, for instance, the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration* Studies has expanded from six issues in 2006 to 15 in 2016 is just one indication of how rapidly this research topic is expanding. The sections one to four provide information well-known to specialists in this subject matter. However, as a scholar of public administration I believe it is very important that migration policies are not just the provenance of scholars in history, sociology, international relations, and comparative politics. As far as I know, there is only one comparative study with contributions from historians, scholars of law, and public administration scholars (Arnold 2010) and it is time that the study of public administration devotes serious attention to this topic. Also, there are various graduate programs (especially in international relations) that focus on migration and public policy, but there is, to my knowledge, none in the study of public administration. As an interdisciplinary study that is focused on the role and position of governments in their respective societies across the globe, public administration's attention for this topic as a wicked problem is timely given the global perception of refugee migration as threatening and refugees encroaching upon countries.

1. *Global Migration in Broad Strokes and some Concepts*

Homo sapiens is, at least by some, regarded as the most invasive species on earth, and certainly the only species among the hominids that has spread across the entire globe. Its success in settling in the widest possible range of ecosystems is attributed to, among others, a genetically encoded penchant for cooperation with unrelated individuals to extraordinary degree (Marean 2015). It is largely agreed that humans came out of Africa, and genetic research has beyond any doubt proved the unity of the human race (Manning 2013, 37). Variation in language, culture, physical appearance, and so forth, is just superficial. Barnard (2011, 40) lists two main Out of Africa migrations: that of *H.erectus* around 1,800,000 BCE and *H.sapiens* around 60,000 BCE. It appears that all people today descend from a population of about 2,000 individuals somewhere in East Africa some 74,000 yrs. ago (ibid. 56).

The literature on human migration in prehistory and history is vast and will not be summarized in this paper (see for accessible overview, Manning 2013), but there have been smaller and larger migrations throughout history. Many of these very early migrations are annually recurring, seasonal *whole-community migrations* where the population simply moves from one ecological setting to another and returning to the same sites every year; some of these early migrations are so-called *colonizing migrations* where human beings set out to find new lands and do not return to their land of origin. Some migrations were limited to a specific world region such as the great migrations of Germanic and Slavic tribes in Europe between 300-900 CE. Another is the migration of Sephardic Jews from Portugal and of Huguenots from France to the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many migrations are limited in terms of time-span from a few years (Sephardim Jews; Huguenots), a few decades (Indonesians around the 1900s and Surinamers in the 1970s to the Netherlands), to a few centuries (the early and high medieval migration in Europe), but the Bantu expansion from Southeast Nigeria to contemporary Zimbabwe started around 1,000 BCE and lasted well into the nineteenth century. It is unknown how many people actually migrated with each migration, but it appears to have been intensifying both in terms of numbers of people and pace since the late fifteenth century.

Human Migration 1850 - 1940

In the three centuries following the conquest of the Americas, about two million people traveled from Europe to the New World. In the same period another eight million Africans were forcibly transported to the Western hemisphere. International migration flows picked up significantly in the nineteenth century. The 1850 - 1940 period (see above) has been called the most intensive migration in human history (Manning 2013, 154).

These are mainly *cross-community migrations* where people move from the community/country where they were born to another community/country. Transnational labor migration dropped significantly between 1930 and 1960, and picked up again after that (see next section).

The most common type of migration, i.e. *home community migration*, is often not regarded as such by most people, that is, it is suggested that most people hardly ever move (Sassen 2000; Castles et al. 2013, 7). However, in actuality most people do move from one community to another within their own country, and only a small portion of the population actually chooses to go to another part of the world (the four categories of migrations above from Manning 2013, 7). An example of substantial home migration is that of 7 million African-Americans from the segregated south to the industrial north in the 1910 - 1970 period.

One major cause of home community migration in the modern era is industrialization (combined with better technology for agricultural production and/or agricultural crises as in, e.g. the third quarter of the nineteenth century) resulting in unprecedented urbanization.

Human Population Living in Urban Areas

Hence, in the past 200 years or so there has been quite massive home community migration. The world's oldest industrial region is the Zaanstreek in the Dutch Republic of the seventeenth century, but the degree of urbanization was relatively limited. Under the influence of industrialization, urbanization spread from England in the late eighteenth century, to Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the past half century, China and South Korea have experienced similar levels of urbanization.

Of the four types of migration distinguished above, it is the cross-community refugee migration that is the most visible and attracts most media attention. Most of the concepts used to characterize migration have to do with cross-community migration. There are *migrant-supplying* and *migrant-receiving* countries; there are *economic* and *asylum seeking* immigrants; there are inclusive *multicultural* policy responses and restrictive *assimilation* policy responses in migrant receiving countries (see section four below). In view of recent and current migration flows, we are in the middle of a second intensive migration period.

2.   *Facts and Figures of Contemporary Migration*

News media in the past several years report on migrant flows with vivid images of people in distress, and some citizens in receiving countries have the impression that they are "flooded" with migrants. Let us look at the numbers first (for overview see Castles et al. 2013). Since the 1980s the number of cross-community migrants worldwide has increased quite significantly (unless mentioned otherwise the following information from UN 2013, 5; UN 2016,1, 7)

Recent International Human Migration

The bulk of international migrants live in Europe (76 mln.), Asia (75 mln.) or North America (54 mln.). Among them, the total number of refugees in 2014 was estimated at 19.5 million of which Turkey received 1.6 million, Pakistan 1.5 million, and Lebanon 1.2 million. More than half of all refugees came from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. Of all migrants in 2015, 157 million came from middle income countries, and this category of migrants has increased at a more rapid pace than that of other income groups.

Largest Diaspora Countries in 2015

In 2015, 104 million migrants were born in Asia, 62 million in Europe, 37 million in Latin America and Caribbean, and 34 million in Africa. The USA hosts by far the largest number of migrants in 2015 (47 mln.), followed by Germany (12 mln.), the Russian Federation (12 mln.), Saudi Arabia (10 mln.), and the UK (9 mln.). There is a variety of countries that receive smaller numbers of migrants, such as the Netherlands with 99,000 migrants arriving in 2015-16, Sweden received about 163,000 migrants in 2015 (Brown and Elbert 2016, 7), and Australia with 168,000 migrants in 2015. Presently about 22% of the Dutch population of immigrant origin (that is, people with at least one foreign-born parent); in 2005 about 10% of the population was foreign born (Van der Meer & Raadschelders 2010, 131). In 2011 about 28% of Australians was foreign-born, and 46% had at least one foreign-born parent (Koopmans and Michaolowski 2017, 65). As for Sweden, in 2000 about 11% of Swedes was foreign born, and this had increased to 17% in 2014 (Brown and Elbert 2016, 9). Detailed country profiles can be found in the webpages of the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (*Institut für Migrationforschung und Interkulturelle Studien*) of the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (*Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*). Between 2007 and 2010 a total of 21 profiles[2] was published, providing data and statistics, historical background, information on legislation and policy, and current public debates.

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[2] In order of appearance: Germany, France, Poland, USA, Turkey, Lithuania, Canada, Romania, Senegal, Netherlands, UK, Israel, Mexico, Brazil, Morocco, European Union, Sweden, Ireland, the Russian Federation, and Australia.

3.   *Tangible Causes of Migration*

The literature is replete with a laundry list of reasons of why people move to other countries. Globalization (knowledge of opportunities elsewhere; internet etc.) and easier means of international transport have helped boost cross-community migration. One way to identify why people migrate is through identifying push- and pull-factors. Push-factors include poverty, unemployment, (perception of) overpopulation (an argument used by Dutch government between 1945 - 1960 to encourage emigration to Australia, Canada, New Zealand or the United States), political and religious repression by government through torture, detention, and killing (e.g., China, Iran, El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia), natural disaster, and (civil) war. In the latter case it should be noted that since the 1990s a shift has occurred from interstate conflict to intrastate conflicts and, thus, most refugee flows in the past 25+ years are because of internal conflicts, which in some cases are prolonged by involvement of developed countries in weapons trade. Another push factor concerns a country's incapacity to govern and the extent of corruption. For instance, the US Department of State has been actively funding economic, social and community development programs in Central American countries. In Panama, for instance, this was largely ineffective since much of the funds were taken by corrupt government officials.

Pull-factors would include the search for personal advancement (job opportunity, moving to country with rapid economic growth) and/or improving family life (e.g., sending earnings to family back home), the search for political and/or religious freedom, search for educational opportunity (through, e.g., study abroad) (see, e.g., Sabharwal 2011, 2013), active outreach of developed countries seeking foreign labor to counteract dropping birth rates and aging populations, existing family links, and just plain curiosity.

Considering this cursory listing of push- and pull-factors it seems that most migrations are influenced by human-made circumstances rather than by natural causes. One could also distinguish between internal and external factors on the one hand and political and economic factors on the other (see below).

Table 1: *Internal and External Causes of Migration: Political and Economic Circumstances*

	Political	Economic
Internal	Oppression, civil war, corruption	Poverty, unemployment, lack of job or educational opportunity
External	Foreign support of oppressive regime	Foreign imposed free trade or open border policy

Most cross-community migration is prompted by political and/or economic factors. In the table above push-factors are listed and, by implication, pull-factors. For instance, lack of educational opportunity makes some people pursue a degree elsewhere (i.e., the pull-factor is then a reputable foreign institution). Lack of job opportunity or simply searching for a more appealing life-style has prompted individuals with a higher education to go elsewhere (such as Irish people with an education in computer programming and IT moving to Canada and Germany in the 1980s), or doctors and engineers moving from India to the United States (Sabharwal 2011, 2013). What the table does not include is the so-called reverse migration of people moving back to their country of origin (Sabharwal and Varma 2016). A pull-factor not included in the table is that of existing family links, where wife and children reunite with the husband/father who migrated and established a decent living standard. Another pull factor is the need for labor, especially for low-skill employment and in the service sector, because the existing working population in developed countries is declining because of dropping birth rates and an aging population. In the early years of the American Republic, the demand for free manual labor by black African slaves provided an economic boom. In this light, slavery could be seen as a pull-factor. Also not included in the table is a push factor, namely that British prisons became overcrowded and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Britain sent about 60,000 prisoners convicted of petty crimes and political prisoners to North America. When the War of Independence ended this possibility, prisoners were sent to Australia. Between 1788 and 1868 some 162,000 prisoners were sent there.

4.   *Migration as Controlling, Palliative, and Governing Policy*

For most of history, people and land were governed by either city-states or empires. Migration simply happened and, as far as I know, any systematic policy for regulating migration patterns was non-existent. In the case of empires, societies became multi-cultural simply as a function of conquest and occupation (Halperin and Palan 2015, 19; Schwartz 2015, 199). Again, to my knowledge, the only "policy", if one can call it that, was at best to tolerate diverse populations as long as they paid taxes. Given the migration flows from the middle of the nineteenth century up to the present, one can expect government policies to evolve but there is serious dearth of research into the development of migration policies over time. The only historical, interdisciplinary and comparative study that specifically addresses government organizations, *regulations*, and policies involved in migration is that by Peri Arnold (2010). According to Arnold, immigration has been more the object of government regulation than emigration, and that immigration developed from being managed via private institutional arrangements to – since World War II – being governed through public organizations and policies.

Describing the state of migration policies, to include attention for public organizations involved, and for government regulations and policies through systematic comparative analysis of some countries is not the subject of this paper. Information about this in existing resources need not be repeated here. However, an analytical framework for migration studies should include at least three elements: types of state, types of policies, and levels of government.

The most obvious is that one can distinguish between three types of states: immigration countries (Australia, Canada, Latin American countries, United States), emigration countries (such as Greece, Italy and Spain in Europe), and mixed countries experiencing significant emigration between 1850 and 1950 and sizeable immigration since the 1950s (in Europe, for instance, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) (Arnold 2010b, 201). Attention is typically focused on migrant-receiving countries.

Somewhat less obvious is that a distinction can be made between three, possibly four types of policies that can be supplementary or complementary. *Controlling policies* are the most passive and focus mainly on regulating and managing the inflow of refugee migrants. *Palliative policies* are more active and their – generally short-term - aim is to alleviate the most egregious living circumstances of refugees while in transit (tent camps, food supply) and once arrived in the host country (housing, employment). The most active are *governing policies* which are

intended to provide a longer-term solution to cross-community migration. These three policies take the perspective of the host country; from a donor country point of view one could add *stimulating policies* which are those of governments who seek to encourage emigration because of fear for overpopulation (which is what prompted Dutch migration in the 1950s), or who seek to ease social unrest and unemployment and/or seek the remittances from former citizens to support the economy (rather than do so through taxation). When looking at current migration policies, the emphasis seems to be on mainly short-term controlling and palliative policies. These three types of policies mainly concern migrant-receiving countries. As far as migrant supplying countries are concerned, they may have policies in place to enhance migration with an eye on, for instance, remittance from emigrants to those who stay behind, as well as policies that seek to maintain emigrants' ties to the homeland (Arnold 2010a, 5). Both these can be regarded as governing policies. Another governing policy could be one on reverse migration which has quickly become an issue of attention in migrant-supplying countries.

Also not so obvious in the scholarly literature is the recognition that migrant policies can be made at and play out in all levels of government. It seems that refugee migrant policy is often thought of as a national government problem and challenge, but migrants settle in a local community and so it is important to take that level of government into consideration.

These three elements will be briefly touched upon below using the four themes identified in the outline provided by panel convener Rolet Loretan: legal aspects, sectoral public policies, managing refugee crises, and regional and global solutions. Especially the latter will serve as the opening salvo for an argument in favor of more promising governing policies.

Legal Aspects: Institutional and Administrative Arrangements of (Il)legal Migration
The earliest (national) legal arrangements for immigration targeted very specific populations such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act in the USA (repealed in 1943), the Canadian Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 and the Australian "whites only" immigration policy that was in force until 1973. These were laws that aimed at controlling the inflow of migrants but have been labelled as rather weak controls (Arnold 2010b, 204). In recent years, attention for regulatory control has picked up, especially as a function of real or perceived increase in illegal or undocumented immigration (Arnold 20101, 6). It seems likely that countries have more elaborate regulations for immigration, and that emigration is generally less or not regulated. There is little

value in outlining legal arrangements country by country, thus highlighting common elements. That information is readily available through simple internet searching. It should be noted that immigration policy is generally a national or federal policy.

How it is organized can also vary from country to country, and that is perhaps best illustrated by a policy field map (Sandfort 2010, 639-640) of migration policy in a specific country. What could a United States' policy field map for migration (see separate attachment) look like? The City of Columbus in Ohio is taken as starting point, since a global policy field map would only provide a helicopter, high-level view that will not allow – literally – space to see in detail what happens at the local level where individuals as citizens and migrants actually experience the opportunities and challenges surrounding migration. Furthermore, what is done and what happens locally will vary from country to country, and cannot be captured in the format of a policy field map. The example offered in this paper, will show that migration is a highly complex issue and involves many public, nonprofit, and private actors. The policy field map presented here[3] is far from complete, and merely serves to illustrate the complexity of this issue. Relations between various actors can be legal, financial, organizational and informational by nature. A *legal relation* is one, for instance, between subnational and local governments as well as nonprofit and private actors that/who will have to follow the law. A *financial relation* is one where an actor funds activities of another actor. An *organizational relation* is that where an international organization has a national representation and where a national/federal agency has deconcentrated field offices throughout a country. *Informational relations* can exist between any of these levels as well. These relations have not been drawn with arrows in this field map for reasons of readability, but the number of relations is significant.

At the *international level* the most well-known organization involved in international migration policies is the United Nations and its various bureaus. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) seeks to advance sustainable development and democratization. The UN Development Program (UNDP) works with countries to support their economic and social development, and works closely together with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) to provide relief to those who have been displaced as a consequence of

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[3] I am grateful for Ms. Caroline Elbert MPA, research assistant at the Glenn College, who put the field map and the bar graphs together and provided various comments upon an earlier version of this paper; I am also grateful for the detailed and thoughtful comments made by Ms. Aditi Thapar, Ph.D.-student at the Glenn College.

natural or man-made disasters. The UNDP has an office in Washington, D.C. The various UN organizations work closely together with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an independent nonprofit organization established in 1951, which recently published an overview of its various activities (IOM 2016). Both operate as advocacy organizations, providing guidance as to what policies and measures might be considered. The IOM maintains relations with nationally based counterparts such as the US Association for International Migration (USAIM), an independent nonprofit.

At the *national level* a distinction needs to be made between unitary states, where the national level is sovereign with regard to migration policy, and federal systems where migration policy can be a shared responsibility between the national and the state (USA, Germany) or provincial (Canada) levels. However, as is the case with many policy areas, migration policy is a legislative and/or actionable issue at all levels of government, involving multiple departments or agencies, as well as involving multiple nonprofit organizations and private companies. With regard to the US, at the national level Congress has legislative authority. Within the executive branch at least five departments are involved. The Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) is a unit within the Department of Justice (DoJ). The EOIR has an Office of Chief Immigration Judge which oversees 58 immigration judges (i.e. field offices) across the nation. Decisions made by these judges can be appealed before the DoJ's Board of Immigration Appeals. The US Supreme Court can hear also hear immigration cases and will review new immigration laws. The DoJ used to be the home department for the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), but this was moved in 2003 as the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to the newly established Department of Homeland Security. DHS also has a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement unit which, among other things, oversees the county level sheriff departments' enforcement of laws concerning arrest and detention of people who have immigrated illegally. The DHS US Customs and Border protection enforces, among other things, trade and drug laws. Next to a variety of legal, financial and organizational relations, DHS maintains connections with a large number of state and local security-oriented agencies and nonprofits. The Department of State (DoS) has an Office of International Migration and a Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration which both maintain relations with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The DoS issues visas to the port of entry, but actual entry falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After

USCIS approves a visa petition by a US-based family member or employer, the case file is handled by a private company (National Visa Center) until it is filed at the appropriate USCIS district office or DoS consulate. For instance, the Ohio USCIS field office is in Cincinnati. The Department of Labor has an Office of Foreign Labor Certification. Its Employment and Training Administration Office takes care of visa or green card applications in as far as the certification is concerned. The US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has an Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) which, i.a., funds a variety of nonprofit activities and has regional field offices across the country.

The Migration Policy Institute, established in 2001, is an independent nonprofit think tank that offers analyses and evaluation of migration and refugee policies to local, regional, national and international actors. Its offices are in Washington, D.C., and it has branches in several other countries. Another nonprofit, the USAIM, has already been mentioned above.

At the subnational *state level* a quick search for specific agencies and offices in Ohio resulted in a few listed as specifically addressing immigration issues. The Ohio Refugee Services is part of the Department of Jobs and Family Services and maintains connections with the federal ORR. Most states also have a State Refugee Coordinator and a State Refugee Health Coordinator. Like the vast majority of states, Ohio is not a sanctuary state (unlike California, Connecticut, New Mexico, and Colorado) so there are no state level agencies charged with migration policy. However, in 1977 the governor established the *Ohio Commission on Hispanic/Latino Affairs* which is biannually funded, more commonly known at the moment as the Latina Affairs Commission. Similar commissions were set up some 30 years later and reporting to the governor: the Ohio Asian and Pacific Islander Advisory Council (2007) and the New African Commission (2008) but these are not funded. We can assume that the state's Attorney General will execute laws passed by Congress. A state organization such as The Ohio State University has an Office of International Affairs which deals with migrant issues (e.g., visas, etc.).

As can be expected, much migration policy and service provision occurs at the *local level*. It has been argued that migration policy could be delegated to the supranational level to improve collaboration among states (see below) and to the subnational level and even the private sector for improving the fit of local policies with migrant flows (Guiraudon 2010). Indeed, some scholars believe that there is a trend to decentralize immigration responsibility to the local level

(as reported by Walker and Leitner 2011, 156). The county sheriffs at the local level are responsible for arresting and detaining illegal immigrants and thus execute policies handed down from the USCIS.

Local immigration policy can be exclusionary or inclusive. In the north of the United States pro-immigrant policies are especially found in 61% of central cities, and that contrasts sharply with anti-immigration policies in 76% of suburban and 82% of rural municipalities (ibid., 171). In terms of spatial distribution, it appears that metropolitan areas are more inclusive, while in many southern states almost 90% of municipalities have adopted an exclusionary policy (ibid. 158-159). Explanations for this specific distribution of policies include a longer history of racial and economic diversity in central cities and inner-ring suburbs and a historically more homogeneous population in the outer-ring suburbs and rural communities (ibid. 161).

In local governments that have adopted pro-immigration policies we find three types of organizational structures: a Mayor's Office, some sort of Immigrant Commission, or a combination of the two. There are about 300 jurisdictions that have identified themselves as "sanctuary" state, county or city. The first "sanctuary city" was Los Angeles in 1979 and it established a *Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs*. San Francisco, a sanctuary city since 1989, has an *Immigrants Rights Commission*. Columbus, Ohio is not a sanctuary city, but it does have a *Community Relations Commission* which helps settling refugees through the New Americans Initiative. Finally, the city of Aurora, Colorado, has an *Immigrant and Refugees Commission* as well as an *Office of International and Immigrant Affairs*. There are also a variety of nonprofit and private initiatives at the local level. With regards to Columbus nonprofits, a range of refugee services is offered by the large *Community Refugee and Immigration Services* (CRIS). Another sizeable nonprofit is *Us Together* which started in Columbus in 2003 providing services to Russian speaking immigrants. It has since expanded its activities to also include people from Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Congo, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and Sudan and operates with offices in Cincinnati, Columbus, and Toledo. Columbus has, for instance, a *Cambodian Mutual Assistance Association* which offers various refugee services and adult education in math, science, computer literacy and citizenship. The *Somali Community Association of Ohio* (as of 2016 the Columbus metropolitan area is home to approximately 55,000 Somalis, the second largest Somali population in the US after Minneapolis) offers services in family counseling, translation, as well as youth programming, job assistance, and elderly programs furthering

literacy and acculturation. They help with resettlement, teach English, workforce development, interpretation, connect people to health care and legal services, and more. As for private sector involvement, most local jurisdictions have law offices offering legal services specific to immigration.

The Sectoral Public Policies for Managing and Integrating Migrants
In line with the distinction made between controlling, palliative and governing policies, most national level activity is controlling by nature and the most important instrument is regulation. This can be primary legislation passed by a legislative body (the US Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952), or secondary legislation, i.e., regulations, which are issued by agencies or departments upon delegation and have the force of law (such as, e.g., precedent decisions by the US Administrative Appeals Office, the BIA (see above) and the Attorney General).

With regard to characterizing national policies that aim at responding to immigrant flows, the distinction made between an ethnic-civic and a monist-pluralist dimension is useful (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011, 210). The ethnic-civic dimension concerns the degree to which immigrants are regarded as members of a host society as manifest in the extent to which they receive legal rights and protection similar to citizens of the host population. The monist-pluralist dimension focuses on the extent to which cultural group differences are accommodated by supporting, for instance, the ethnic and religious identity of migrants and even exempting specific cultural groups from certain obligations. In a comparative article Ersanilli and Koopmans distinguish three types of responses (2011, 213). The *civic-assimilation regime* offers little accommodation of diversity but provides easy access to individual legal equality (for instance: France). The *ethnic-assimilation regime* also offers little accommodation of diversity and makes access for immigrants to individual citizen rights quite difficult (for instance: Germany). The Netherlands is characterized as a *multiculturalist regime* where easy access to individual legal equality is combined with a high degree of accommodating diversity. The USA overall could be characterized as an ethnic-assimilation regime, while in some local communities, and especially in the so-called sanctuary cities, there may be policies accommodating for diversity.

They present these three types of regimes as ideal types, but the situation on the ground is not as static as these examples appear to suggest. For instance, in the Netherlands there were no policies to help migrants settle and adjust until the 1960s. With the influx of guest workers from

Morocco and Turkey the Dutch government put policies in place inspired by the notion of multiculturalism. The immigrant was offered programs in Dutch language and culture, but not expected to become a 'national citizen' (Van der Meer and Raadschelders 2010, 139). This changed significantly in the mid-1990s with a national citizenship policy "…forcing adult immigrants to attend compulsory 'integration' classes that teach the national language and 'European' values." (Kymlicka 2003, 201) The 'traditional' Dutch self-image of tolerance of others has since given way to a much stricter assimilation policy that is supported by a less tolerant population (Entzinger 2003; Buruma 2007). As we know, the Netherlands is not alone in this move to much stricter entry and assimilation policies, and thus becoming more similar to the German case. Research suggests that assimilation policies do not matter much (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2011, 226), since migrants cannot but be expected to continue identifying with values and practices of their country of origin (Scheffer 2007, 105-106). And, recent research also seems to show that labor market participation does not lead to sociocultural assimilation (Koopmans 2016). If governments take the slogan of 'embracing diversity' seriously, they would socialize migrants into the public political culture of their new country (Scheffer 2007, 113-114). This means that immigrants are expected to learn about government and the duties and obligations the law defines. Nothing more, nothing less.

At the subnational level, and especially the local level, both palliative and governing policies are manifest. The sanctuary movement that started in 1979 has been mentioned above. More recently is the Welcoming Cities and Counties initiative that was launched in 2013 and as of July 2015 some 50 cities from 31 different states have joined. Columbus, Ohio, joined in June 2013. The programs offered by such welcoming cities have been categorized in four primary areas: business development, workforce development, community development and public safety[4] (unless stated otherwise, the following from Huang and Liu 2016). Business development seeks to encourage legal immigrant entrepreneurship through training (Dayton, Ohio), making resources from the Small Business Enterprise Program available to migrants (Atlanta), and technical assistance and financing opportunities (Baltimore). Workforce development is aimed at connecting immigrants to job opportunities and giving them job skills. Community development includes efforts to attract and retain immigrants by providing them investment opportunities in

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[4] The term 'public safety' is from Huang and Liu (2016) and is not intended to convey policies protecting the host population from migrants.

targeted neighborhoods (Austin, Detroit). Atlanta offers incentives and help to immigrant grocers who wish to set up shop in food deserts. Finally, public safety programs aim at fostering trust between newcomers and local residents, which include efforts to increase access of immigrants to city services, basic protections from unfair detainment and from deportation of undocumented migrants (Chicago; and this is also one of the objectives of sanctuary cities), and cultural competency training for city employees (Atlanta) and university faculty and staff (The Ohio State University). The first three types of programs could be labelled as palliative since they offer opportunities to migrants, but do not necessarily help them to acclimate. The most visible of palliative policies provide migrants with food, clothing, and shelter. The public safety program could be a governing policy type, in that it could aim at helping migrants to acclimate into the new society upon a multicultural basis. That multicultural policies are actually more difficult because of strong underlying societal problems will be addressed in section five below.

Managing Refugee Crises Worldwide: Emergency and Operational Measures
In light of the numbers provided in section two, refugee migration represents about 8-9% of overall migration, but refugees dominate the public's perception and understanding of international migration. Policies that seek to slow or even halt international migration may possibly control it, but certainly are not helping refugees in any way. In the first week of President Trump's administration, the executive decisions to build a wall at the Mexican border, to add 5,000 border patrol officers and some 10,000 immigration officers, to limit federal moneys going to sanctuary cities, to call for a 30-day visa stop for people from so-called terror-sensitive Islamic countries (e.g. Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), and to stop people coming from designated countries entering the United States, are examples of exclusionary policies that do very little, if anything, for the situation on the ground. Inclusive policies such as those at the local level have proven to be much more productive. However, and in light of what was said above about the nature of most policies, most exclusionary and inclusive policies are actually emergency and operational measures, they do very little for truly establishing a culture that encourages and celebrates diversity. Former Germany Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer points to the importance of dealing with causes of migration at the source rather than in the settler countries, and failure to do so has in his view "…created a legitimacy vacuum that xenophobic populists are now filling." (2015)

Regional and Global Solutions for People Mobility: Forced and Voluntary Migration

Clearly, migration policy is a very complex problem given that it involves many, many public, nonprofit and private actors and requires intervention and action at an *operational, day-to-day level* (controlling and palliative policies) as well as at a *constitutional level* (governing policies). The latter does not refer to anything constitutional in the legal sense, but to attitudes and actions that lie at and influence a society's foundational values. Much migration in history and today has been driven by economic considerations and is then mainly voluntary by nature. Policy reform that would focus on economic causes of migration might very well limit the flow of migrants across the globe. Such a policy is not so much intended to keep people out of the cornucopia of Western countries, but to increase the standard of living in the home country. That type of economic policy reform will not do much for forced migration, where people leave their country for political and humanitarian reasons. However, whether dealing with forced or voluntary migration, it is clear that more cooperation between countries (Hollifield 2000; Martin et al. 2006) and between levels of government is needed, but this is easier said than done and might require differentiating forced and voluntary migration.

The policy field map illustrates the complexity of migration policy, but does nothing with regard to outlining actual and actionable longer-term policies. Collaboration that goes beyond information-gathering between sovereign countries and between these and non-profit and private actors is glaringly missing. In other words, to develop regional and global solutions efforts are needed at *collective or decision-making level*. Thus far, there is no organization that has the decision-making capacity and authority to develop a more long-term migration policy. This is in part because migration policy is firmly entrenched in national policies. Also, international organizations such as the United Nations and supranational organizations such as the International Organization for Migration only have informational and some (small-scale) economic instruments at their disposal; regulatory and most economic instruments and incentives are controlled by territorial states.

5.   *Foreign Cause, Domestic Problem:*
        Rent-Seeking Economic Policy and Exclusionary Social Relations

In its current manifestation international migration is a wicked problem because of the sheer volume of forced and voluntary migration, and because regulatory and palliative policies focus on symptoms only. Of the multiple governmental, nonprofit and private actors involved, none has the authority to pursue and execute policies that aim to deal with the underlying causes of migration and the increasing hostility to migrants in host countries. There will always be migration, if only because people are curious. However, the volume of migration is highly influenced by factors that can to some degree be controlled by addressing the political and/or economic conditions that prompt migration at the point of origin.

With regard to political causes, the substitution of democratic government for a totalitarian or dictatorial government will go a long way to address forced migration. In countries torn by political factions and without clear leadership armed militias create havoc among the population. Democratization and concentrating the monopoly of the use of violence in the state and its government, and thus constraining and hopefully preempting the emergence of armed militias (e.g., Boko Haram, Al-shabaab), are prime objectives that have been supported by developed countries for decades, and especially since the focus of much development aid since the 1980s has shifted to institution building, away from the initial emphasis on infrastructure investments and heavy industries (1950s-1960s) and the subsequent focus on immediate needs such as housing, education, health care (1970s) (Raadschelders 1993). In as far as institution building is concerned, the establishment of democracy has been quite successful since the number of democratic countries has been steadily increasing since the 1970s (Torfason and Ingram 2010).

Political development goes hand in hand with economic development, and it is the latter that may well be the more important source of civil unrest. Lack of political freedom (e.g. North Korea) can but does not necessarily translate into a standard of living below subsistence level (e.g., Nazi Germany). Democratization, however, is not easy to achieve when economic underdevelopment and resulting poverty are persistent conditions. Developed countries may not be able to "flip a switch" and turn a country into a democracy and its people into citizens with rights, but they can make a significant difference in terms of economic policies. This is best illustrated by briefly describing global changes in domestic and international economic policy since the Second World War.

In the 30 years following WWII the economic policies of developed countries continued on the basis laid in the 1930s: government intervention for economic development. This was the case both in European countries whose economies and infrastructure had to be rebuilt after the devastation of the war as well as in, for instance, the settler countries (e.g., Australia, Canada, USA, New Zealand) that took in large numbers of migrants from these European countries. The overall quality of life increased markedly as assessed in, for instance, increases in educational attainment, health care, housing quality, and life expectancy (Fourastié 1979, 175). People's buying power increased, and income inequality was dropping as a function of progressive taxation (ibid., 198, 244-245). The three decades between 1945 and 1975 represented an historically unprecedented narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor, hence why Fourastié titled his book *Les Trente Glorieuses*. Economic policies focused on the development of infrastructure and industry and these helped the emergence of middle-income countries in Europe (e.g., Greece, Ireland, Israel, Portugal, Spain), Asia (e.g., Hong Kong, Mongolia, Singapore, South Korea), and in Latin America and the Middle East (Reinert 2007, 58; Agénor et al. 2012; Felipe 2012). Economic policy at home and abroad has changed significantly since the mid to late-1970s, away from Keynesianism and toward macro-economic discipline, market economy, and free trade.

This neoliberal or market fundamentalist approach to economic policy has come to be known as the "Washington Consensus" and this term is used in a much broader sense than what John Williamson, the economist who coined the term, intended and referring to three Washington D.C. based organizations: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department. Williamson (1989) used it to capture a series of policy recommendations for Latin-American countries. These recommendations included, among others, fiscal discipline (and limiting large deficits), tax reform (including reducing marginal tax rates), trade liberalization (including low and somewhat uniform tariffs), privatization of state enterprises, and deregulation. In a speech 13 years later Williamson pointed out that his argument was much more nuanced and never meant to imply monetarism, supply-side economics, or a minimal state (Williamson 2002). He also pointed out that his second recommendation, that of directing expenditures toward basic health care, education, and infrastructure, was often just neglected. For centuries, scholars in the early modern world actually recognized that spending for education, infrastructure, and technology, together with

developing a diversified economy was the recipee to economic growth and overall societal well-being (Reinert 2007, 41), and that same recipe is again being advocated by some economists (e.g. Stiglitz 2016) and political scientists (Doner and Schneider 2016).

As early as 1613, the Italian scholar Antonio Serra observed that the key to economic development was to have a large number of different activities in a diversified economy (Reinert 2007, 7). A little more than 40 years later Veit Ludvig von Seckendorf, author of the first handbook of public administration (1656), wrote that economic diversification through linking agriculture and industry would make the state work better and provide care for the poor and sick (Reinert 2007, 92, 225). A country that focuses only on agriculture and production of raw materials will quickly experience diminishing returns, and that, so argued British economist Alfred Marshall in the late nineteenth century, was the cause of all migrations in history (ibid., 71, 156). Under the neoliberal version of the Washington Consensus the idea was that developing countries should focus their economic activities on where their comparative advantage was (agriculture, raw materials), and they were promised loans and grants in exchange for removing industrial tariffs. This has been a one-way street, because developed countries did not remove their tariffs for agricultural products from the developing world. Real economic development comes from stimulating the economy through investments in education, infrastructure and technology, and not from focusing on activities that result in diminishing returns, and certainly not from counting on remittances since the money that is sent back home is used for consumption and not for investment.

American government recognized the need for a combined agricultural-industrial policy when it replaced the Morgenthau Plan of 1945 (named after Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau) that aimed at turning Germany into an agricultural nation, and resulted in severe economic and social distress, with the Marshall Plan (named after Secretary of State George Marshall) that focused on rebuilding Germany and Europe through, i.a., industrialization (ibid., 152). The Morgenthau Plan and the Washington Consensus are indicative of rent-seeking behavior, which is the practice of manipulating economic policy in order to achieve increased profits, on the part of, for instance, industrialists and bankers. It rewards behavior where income is acquired not as a function of creating wealth, but merely as one of taking a larger share of wealth. Austerity measures for struggling economies in Europe (e.g., Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), as advised by the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and

the European Commission, the Troika (Stiglitz 2016, 17), have the same type of effect: it does not improve economic development, but depresses it further. National economies weaken because of fiscal constraints imposed upon them; productive investments such as in education, technology, infrastructure, and in small and middle-sized enterprises are curtailed (Stiglitz 2016, 301). As a consequence, capital and labor move to countries where public investments are made that increase returns to private investment (Stiglitz 2016, 137, 217). Herbert Hoover's austerity measures in response to the 1929 Wall Street crash, the Morgenthau Plan in 1945-1946, the Washington Consensus measures advising austerity and lowering tariff barriers in tthe 1990s, and the Troika's austerity measures in the 2000s, all have one major consequence in common: they increase significantly income inequality both between nations as well as within nations (Stiglitz 2013). In retrospect, the title that Fourastié gave his book is even more pointed than at the time that it was published: the thirty glorious years are, at least at the moment, behind us.

It is "natural" – and at least to be expected - that those who have political and/or economic power seek to concentrate that power, but this can only happen when the political system is captured by moneyed interests. This capture is possible by lowering the marginal tax rate and by deregulation. Western governments, and especially the United States, have not only bowed to the private sector's demand for deregulation, they have also bowed to smaller or larger degree to popular pressures for policies aimed at keeping out strangers. What rent-seeking is to the wealthy, is xenophobia to populists. The Enlightenment's sense of tolerance, culminating in the notion of basic human rights, is under pressure. Already in 1977 the British sociologist Richard Sennett warned against increasing incivility toward strangers, and he pointed to two trends that he found troublesome. The first is one that started back in the nineteenth century when leadership became a form of seduction; when political leaders identified their own sentiments and impulses with those of a specific audience. The second is that the scope of community is narrowed to include only those who are considered as part of the in-group. Outsiders, unknowns, strangers are to be kept out (Sennett 1977, 265) or assimilated (Bauman 2000, 101). The Enlightenment's sense of civility is an ability to interact with strangers without holding their otherness against them and without forcing them to adopt the values and habits of the host country (Bauman 2000, 104). Host countries would do well not to play on rather primal fears of strangers, and execute and support policies that help citizens of host countries connect

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with and understand migrants. But, of course, since 9/11 national security issues have become a serious impediment to any satisfactory (refugee) migration policy......

6.   *Concluding Remarks: A Humanity of Courage*

In this paper several standard elements of migration studies have been mentioned (data, definitions, historical development). Most, and perhaps even all, policies that seek to do something about international refugee migration are ad hoc, controlling and palliative by nature and do not contribute to longer-term solutions. This could be a function of the complexity of refugee migration as an issue of policy collaboration. The policy field map showed how many actors are involved even from the vantage point of the City of Columbus only. Fair, equitable, effective, and efficient collaboration between public, nonprofit and private actors at all geographic levels will require a commitment to long-term change. So far, it has been argued, the various actors deal with symptoms of refugee migration rather than with fundamental causes.

Two fundamental causes of (refugee) migration have been suggested. The first cause is that of rent-seeking behavior and economic policy that favors those in power and does not contribute to creating a diversified economy that would enable a country to pull itself out of the downward spiral of production with diminishing returns and reduce capital and labor flight. Economic and social policies are intertwined, and so one solution would include strengthening oversight regulation, increasing marginal tax rates, and investments in accessible education, technology and infrastructure. The second cause are policies that seek to keep migrants out and emphasize the importance of a homogeneous population for the protection of national culture. Countering that calls for programs focused on civility, civil discourse, and citizenship.

With regard to economic policy, developed countries can take the lead in the way they did when rebuilding Europe after the Second World War. That policy of investment for future potential paid off and resulted in a historically unprecedented economic growth and a more equitable distribution of income. The pendulum has swung to the other extreme since the mid to late-1970s and resulted in rapidly increasing income inequalities in all Western countries (Piketty 2014). It is important to keep in mind that this is not so much a function of economic policies and mechanisms, but rather of political decisions (ibid. 20) that deregulated the market and made egregious rent-seeking possible. It will take collaboration between governments to alter the

present course and recognize that "self-interest properly understood" (cf. De Tocqueville 2000, 502) means that advancing the common welfare is a precondition for an individual's well-being. The same reasoning holds for relations between nations, and has been applied, for instance, when the Marshall Plan was implemented from 1947 on. In fact, the same reasoning can be applied to reaching out to strangers. We are better people when helping others out of political and/or social-economic distress. Political leaders have the responsibility to not only advance the notion that diversified economies thrive, but also that diversified societies are richer. It is a pity, to say the least, that redistributive social-economic policies that help people's ability to improve their standard of living are drawn into the contrast between right respectively left-wing politics. Political leadership should display the courage to truly represent the interests of all, and not stoop to the interests of some, whether they be political-economic elites or populist groups.

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List of Abbreviations used in the Policy Field Map

BoIA = Board of Immigration Appeals
BoPRM = Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
CMAA = Cambodian Mutual Assistance Association
CRC = community relations committee
DHHS – Department of Health and Human Services
DHS = Department of Homeland Security
DoJ = Department of Justice
DoL = Department of Labor
DoS= Department of State
EOIR= Executive Office of Immigration Review
ETAO = Employment and Training Administration Office
IOM= International Organization for Migration
OCIJ = Office of Chief Immigration Judge
ODJFS = Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services
OFLC = Office of Foreign Labor Certification.
OIF = Office of International Affairs
OIM: Office of International Migration
ORR = Office of Refugee Resettlement
OSU = Ohio State University
UN = United Nations
USAIM = US Association for International Migration
USCBP = US Customs and Border Protection
ISCIS = US Citizenship and Immigration Services
SCAO = Somali Community Association of Ohio
USICE = US Immigration and Customs Enforcement

International

UN IOM

Executive Branch Legislative Branch Judicial Branch NGO

National

US President

DOJ DoS DHS DoL

BOIR OIM USICF ETOA

US Dept of HHS BoIA BoPRM USCIS OFLC

Office of Refugee Resettlement USCBP

US Congress US Supreme Court

USAIM

NVC

State

ODJFS OSU Governor Attorney General

Ohio Refugee Services OIA OCIJ

State Legislature

Us Together

Local

County Sheriff City of Columbus

CRC

CRIS

SCAO

CMAA

Legal Services